UNITED STATES DISTRICT COUR NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YO	
REBECCA O.,	
Plaintiff,	
V.	6:21-CV-0403 (ML)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

OLINSKY LAW GROUP
Counsel for the Plaintiff
250 South Clinton Street-Suite 210

Syracuse, New York 13202

APPEARANCES:

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION Counsel for the Defendant J.F.K. Federal Building, Room 625 15 New Sudbury Street Boston, Massachusetts 02203

MIROSLAV LOVRIC, United States Magistrate Judge

MOLLY CARTER, ESQ. Special Assistant U.S. Attorney

ALEXANDER C. HOBAICA, ESQ.

OF COUNSEL:

ORDER

Currently pending before the Court in this action, in which Plaintiff seeks judicial review of an adverse administrative determination by the Commissioner of Social Security, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), are cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings.¹ Oral

This matter, which is before me on consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), has been treated in accordance with the procedures set forth in General Order No. 18. Under that General Order once issue has been joined, an action such as this is considered procedurally, as if cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings had been filed pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

argument was heard in connection with those motions on September 20, 2022, during a

telephone conference conducted on the record. At the close of argument, I issued a bench

decision in which, after applying the requisite deferential review standard, I found that the

Commissioner's determination was supported by substantial evidence, providing further detail

regarding my reasoning and addressing the specific issues raised by Plaintiff in this appeal.

After due deliberation, and based upon the Court's oral bench decision, which has been

transcribed, is attached to this order, and is incorporated herein by reference, it is

ORDERED as follows:

1) Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 15) is DENIED.

Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 21) is GRANTED. 2)

The Commissioner's decision denying Plaintiff Social Security benefits is 3)

AFFIRMED.

4) Plaintiff's Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED.

The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment, based upon this 5)

determination, DISMISSING Plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety and closing this case.

Dated: September 22, 2022

Binghamton, New York

Miroslav Lovric

United States Magistrate Judge

Miroslav Fario

Northern District of New York

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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vs. 6:21-CV-0403

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

DECISION AND ORDER

September 20, 2022

The HONORABLE MIROSLAV LOVRIC,
DISTRICT MAGISTRATE JUDGE

APPEARANCES

For Plaintiff: ALEXANDER HOBAICA, ESQ.

For Defendant: MOLLY CARTER, ESQ.

Ruth I. Lynch, RPR, RMR, NYSRCR Official United States Court Reporter Binghamton, New York 13901

THE COURT: All right. The Court's going to begin its analysis and decision as follows.

Plaintiff has commenced this proceeding pursuant to Title 42 United States Code Sections 405(g) and 1383(c) to challenge the adverse determination by the Commissioner of Social Security finding that she was not disabled at the relevant times and therefore ineligible for the benefits that she sought. By way of background, the Court states as follows:

Plaintiff was born in 1978. She is currently approximately 43 years old. She was approximately 40 years old on March 30th of 2019, the application date. At the administrative hearing plaintiff testified that she lives in a house with her parents and her son who was a minor at the time but has since reached the age of majority. Plaintiff stands approximately 5 feet 8 inches tall and weighs approximately 215 pounds. Plaintiff has at least a high school education.

Procedurally the Court states as follows:

Plaintiff applied for Title XVI benefits on March 30th of

2019 alleging an onset date of March 26 of 2019.

Administrative Law Judge Gretchen Mary Greisler conducted a

hearing on August 26th of 2020 to address plaintiff's

application for benefits. ALJ Greisler issued an

unfavorable decision on September 21 of 2020. That became a

final determination of the agency on February 5th of 2021 when the Social Security Administration Appeals Council denied plaintiff's application for review.

This action was commenced on April 28, 2021, and it is timely.

In her decision, ALJ Greisler applied the familiar five-step test for determining disability.

At step one, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since

March 30th, 2019, the application date.

At step two, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff suffers from severe impairments that impose more than minimal limitations on her ability to perform basic work activities, specifically left lumbar radiculopathy, left carpal tunnel syndrome, osteoporosis, COPD, obesity, bipolar II disorder, and polysubstance abuse.

At step three, ALJ Greisler concluded that plaintiff's conditions do not meet or medically equal any of the listed presumptively disabling conditions set forth in the Commissioner's regulations, and the ALJ focused on the following listings: Listing 1.04 dealing with disorders of the spine, listing 3.02 dealing with chronic respiratory disorders, listing 3.03 dealing with asthma, and listing 12.04 dealing with depressive, bipolar and related disorders.

Next, the ALJ next determined that plaintiff
retains the residual functional capacity to perform light
work except that she will need brief, 1- to 2-minute changes
in position after sitting, standing, or walking for 30
minutes, but that plaintiff retains the ability to remain on
task. The ALJ also concluded that plaintiff can
occasionally stoop, balance, crouch, kneel, and climb stairs
and ramps, but cannot crawl, climb ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds. The ALJ also concluded that plaintiff cannot be
exposed to unprotected heights and cannot tolerate
concentrated exposure to respiratory irritants. The ALJ
concluded that plaintiff can perform simple, routine, and
repetitive tasks in a work environment free of fast-paced
production requirements, involving only simple work-related
decisions, and a few, if any, workplace changes. ALJ noted
that plaintiff can be around coworkers and supervisors
throughout the day, with occasional interaction, and she can
tolerate incidental interaction with the public, and
plaintiff can make simple decisions and tolerate occasional
changes.
At step four, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff

At step four, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work as a retail cashier, a stocker, a storekeeper, or as a fast food worker.

At step five, the ALJ concluded that, based on the testimony of the vocational expert, and considering

plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that plaintiff can perform. More specifically, the vocational expert testified that plaintiff could perform the requirements of representative occupations such as garment sorter, dispatch/router, and linen grader. As a result, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff has not been under a disability as defined in the Social Security Act since March 30th of 2019, the date the application was filed.

Now, as the parties know, this Court's functional role in this case is limited and extremely deferential. I must determine whether correct legal principles were applied and whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence, defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would find sufficient to support a conclusion. As the Second Circuit noted in Brault V. Social Security

Administration Commissioner, that can be found at 683 F.3d

443, a 2012 Second Circuit case, and therein the Second

Circuit noted that this standard is demanding, more so than the clearly erroneous standard. The Second Circuit noted in Brault that once there is a finding of fact, that fact can be rejected only if a reasonable fact-finder would have to conclude otherwise.

Now, in this appeal before this Court, the

plaintiff raises one contention. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence because she failed to evaluate the opinion from NP Miller in accordance with the proper legal standards.

The Court begins its analysis and decision by stating the following: For the reasons stated in defendant's brief, I find that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's RFC finding. As set forth in defendant's brief, the opinions of Dr. Puri, Dr. Baronos, and Dr. Lawrence, none of which were challenged by plaintiff, support the RFC finding. Further, as set forth by defendant, the ALJ supportably found that Miss Miller's opinion was not persuasive because she completed it with plaintiff's input and it was inconsistent with the medical evidence and plaintiff's activities.

The Court notes, first, as I've stated, the Court notes that Miss Miller's opinion dated June 27th of 2017 and October 26 of 2017 were outside the period in question, having been -- having been rendered approximately two years before the alleged onset date.

Second, with respect to Miss Miller's opinion dated September 24th of 2019, which was cosigned by Dr. Stewart, the ALJ properly considered the opinion's supportability in concluding that it likely reflected plaintiff's assessment of her function as opposed to Miss

Miller's medical opinion. The Court also notes in addition, plaintiff's citations to Miss Miller's treatment notes from June 2017 to September 2018 are unavailing because the relevant time period began in March of 2019. See case Jeffrey G. versus Commissioner of Social Security, 20-cv-1016, a 2021 case, that can be found at West Law 4844146, at page 6. And that is a Northern District New York October 18, 2021 decision issued by Magistrate Judge Baxter. And therein Judge Baxter wrote, the case stands for holding that the ALJ was under no obligation to consider the plaintiff's alleged condition before the date he applied for benefits. In addition, citations to plaintiff's subjective complaints do not enhance the supportability of Miss Miller's opinion.

Third, the Court notes the ALJ properly considered that Miss Miller's opinion was inconsistent with the medical evidence. A reading of the ALJ's whole opinion informs her evaluation of Miss Miller's opinion. For example, the Court notes the following: The ALJ noted a June 2019 consultative exam did not support a physical disability because plaintiff showed normal gait and stance, used no assistive device, needed no help changing or getting on and off the exam table, would rise from a chair without difficulty, and showed full strength.

The ALJ also noted although plaintiff cites to

Dr. White's July 2019 observation of lumbar tenderness with a reduced range of motion, Dr. Puri also observed reduced lumbar range of motion and back tenderness and still opined that plaintiff had, at most, mild physical limitations. In addition, Dr. Baronos considered Dr. Puri's report and still found that plaintiff could do light work with postural limitations. Moreover, Dr. Lawrence considered Dr. Puri's report and specifically cited Dr. White's July 2019 observation of lumbar tenderness and still found that plaintiff could do medium work with postural limitations. The ALJ reasonably relied on those assessments over Miss Miller's opinion.

With respect to plaintiff's arguments regarding her daily activities, the ALJ supportably concluded that plaintiff was doing some farm work based on her statements documented in the record. Moreover, plaintiff's daily activities, which in addition to farm work included caring for her five-year-old nephew, were just one piece of the record that the ALJ noted were inconsistent with Miss Miller's opined limitations and plaintiff's alleged symptoms. See Morris versus Commissioner of Social Security, 12-cv-1795, that's a 2014 case, that can be found at West Law 1451996, at page 8. And that is a Northern District New York April 14, 2014 case issued by District Court Judge D'Agostino. And that case stands for the

proposition the issue is not whether plaintiff's limited liability -- excuse me, let me start that over again. The issue is not whether plaintiff's limited ability to undertake normal daily activities demonstrates her ability to work. Rather, the issue is whether the ALJ properly discounted plaintiff's testimony regarding her symptoms to the extent that it is inconsistent with other evidence. In this case further, the ALJ limited plaintiff to light work with additional postural limitations.

Although I find that the ALJ's conclusion that Miss Miller's opinion was internally inconsistent was poorly phrased, I do not find that to be a basis for remand. The ALJ stated that Miss Miller's, quote, opinion is internally inconsistent, as the sit/stand would not allow her to change positions for 15 minutes, when she is assessed as unable to sit or stand for 15 minutes, end quote. That can be found at docket number 12 at 27, transcript page 22.

Miss Miller opined that plaintiff could sit and stand for 10 minutes at one time. In addition, Miss Miller opined that plaintiff would need to take unscheduled breaks during an 8-hour workday. Miss Miller opined that these unscheduled breaks would occur every 1 to 2 hours, quote, to change position, end quote, and plaintiff would require approximately 15 minutes of rest before returning to work.

The ALJ's reference to 15-minute increments is

puzzling because Ms. Miller's opinion merely stated that plaintiff would require approximately 15 minutes of rest after her unscheduled break before returning to work, during which she could presumably be changing positions as frequently as she desired. Regardless of the ALJ's confusing wording, Miss Miller's opinion does appear internally inconsistent. If plaintiff can only sit or stand for 10 minutes at one time, it appears as though she would require position changes more frequently than every 1 to 2 hours.

In addition, for the reasons set forth in defendant's brief, the ALJ supportably concluded that Miss Miller's opinion was not persuasive because it was not supported by or consistent with the other evidence in the record.

For these reasons as I just set forth in the analysis, I therefore conclude that the plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied. Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted. Plaintiff's complaint is hereby dismissed. And the Commissioner's decision denying plaintiff benefits is affirmed.

That constitutes the decision and analysis of this Court.